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WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
tion in favor of the copyright owners," but, hopefully, United
Artists will provide the impetus for Congress to enact more defini-
tive and equitable copyright legislation.
ROBERT J. CRUMP
]MPLIED WARRANTY - PROPERTY - VENDOR
AND PURCHASER
Mitchem v. Johnson, 7 Ohio St. 2d 66,
218 N.E.2d 564 (1966).
The concept of an implied warranty has been referred to as a
"freak hybrid born of the illicit intercourse of tort and contract."'
Since the landmark opinion by Mr. Justice Cardozo in MacPherson v,.
Buick Motor Co.,2 the doctrine has gained wide acceptance in the
field of consumer products. The result has been to give the plain-
tiff added flexibility in bringing his cause of action. While at com-
mon law the plaintiff was required to prove both negligence and
privity of contract, the theory of implied warranty has often allowed
him to recover on the basis of strict liability.'
A great extension of the implied warranty doctrine in recent
years has taken place in the area of realty. The Supreme Court of
Ohio, however, in the case of Mitchem v. Johnson,4 rejected the
idea that a builder-vendor impliedly warrants that a residence he is
constructing will be fit for its intended use. In Mitchem, the plain-
tiffs had purchased a lot and residence from the defendant-builder
while he was in the process of completing the structure. The plain-
tiffs made no complaint about the builder's work in completing the
house.5 Although the facts were in dispute, the plaintiffs alleged
the following defects: the building had been constructed on a low
portion of the lot without foundation drainage tile to protect it
from surface water problems; surface water had accumulated be-
neath the building, causing saturation of the roof supports, roof
insulation, and the roof itself; the builder had used improper roof-
ing, sheeting, and insulation; water seepage had caused the roof to
6 9 
In its brief on appeal, the defendant thoroughly discusses both the supposedly er-
roneous conclusions of Judge Herlands concerning the technology of CATV systems and
of the analogous case law relied upon by the Judge. Brief for Defendant-Appellant,




warp and pull apart; and heavy rains and soil moisture had im-
paired the efficiency of the septic tanks, rendering certain toilet fa-
cilities unusable. Affirmative defenses stating that modifications
made by the plaintiffs were the proximate cause of the problems
and that damages resulted from uncontrollable land conditions were
denied.7 The common pleas court instructed the jury to make its
finding on the implied warranty by a builder, that he would com-
plete the house "in such a way that it will be fit for its intended use
and that the work would be done in a reasonably efficient and
workmanlike manner."8  The judgment for the plaintiffs was ap-
pealed by the defendant to the Lucas County Court of Appeals
where it was reversed and remanded for a new trial on the grounds
that the written instruction was improper and prejudicial.' The
case was then certified by the court of appeals as being in conflict
with Vanderschrier v. Aaron,"0 a case which held that a builder-
vendor of an unfinished house impliedly warrants that the house
will be completed so that it will be reasonably fit for its intended
use and that the work would be completed in a workmanlike man-
ner.1
1
IProsser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE
I.J. 1099, 1126 (1960).
2217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
3 The development of the implied warranty was rife with problems as to require-
ments of privity, notice, and attempts at disclaimers. Strict tort liability has dispensed
with these problems by failing to recognize any of them. Since none of these problems
appear to have been raised in the implied warranty of realty cases to date, it seems that
the courts have used implied warranty terminology to refer to strict liability. For the
purposes of this article, the implied warranty to realty will be equated with strict liability.
47 Ohio St. 2d 66, 218 N.E.2d 594 (1966).
5 However, some of the defects actually occurred subsequent to the sale. The plain-
tiffs' fourth allegation shows that at the time of the sale, the septic tanks had not been
installed, and the rough grading had not been undertaken. Record, p. 2, Mitchem v.
Johnson, 7 Ohio St. 2d 66, 218 N.E.2d 594 (1966).
6 7 Ohio St. 2d at 67, 218 N..2d at 595-96.
7id. at 68, 218 N.E.2d at 596.
s Ibid.
9 Ibid. For a discussion of why the instruction was prejudicial see note 10 infra.
10 103 Ohio App. 340, 140 N.E.2d 819 (1957). In this case, the plaintiffs also
purchased a partially completed house and after moving in, found that the sewer line
which had been installed after the sale failed to carry sewage, causing the basement to
become flooded and damaging furniture and carpeting.
In light of the above, it is not dear why the Mitchem appellate court found the in-
struction prejudicial. Either it felt that implied warranty was not the law in Ohio or
it was concerned with the fact that the defect occurred prior to the sale in Mitchem and
subsequent to the sale in Vanderschrier.
111d. at 342, 140 N.E.2d at 821. From the facts in Vanderschrier as stated above
the deciding court apparently viewed the implied warranty as attaching only to that por-
tion of the house which was completed after the sale was made. The position of the
1967]
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In affirming the appellate court's decision and remanding for
further proceedings, the Ohio Supreme Court denied the validity of
an implied warranty and instead upheld the builder's common law
duty to build in a workmanlike manner and to use ordinary care
and skill.12 Speaking through Judge Schneider, the court relied
upon the common law theory of caveat emptor and emphasized that
the builder was not an insurer."h The decision was also based upon
the proposition that when the finished product is realty, an agree-
ment to furnish labor and materials is not a sale. 4
The court's adherence to common law negligence in Mitchem
is largely a result of a hesitancy to apply strict liability to the builder
and to make him an insurer. Unfortunately, the court, in its most
recent decisions, seems to have misunderstood the consequences of
strict liability. In its reluctance to adopt this theory, it has readily
relied on such standard formulas as res ipsa loquitur and negligence
per se, in the belief that they differ from implied warranty as to
burden of proof and available defenses. 5
Although the form is somewhat different, the effect of res ipsa
loquitur and strict liability is basically the same. Both permit the
plaintiff to prove his case on what amounts to circumstantial evi-
dence. 6 The actual negligent act of the defendant need not be
proven. Under the res ipsa doctrine the injury or damage must be
Ohio Supreme Court on the meaning of the word "completed" is confusing when it is
noted that the holding in Mitcbem seems to apply to the whole of the house - parts
built before as well as after the sale - and that the court heard an argument based on
implied warranty of fitness when the defects complained of occurred before the sale.
12 7 Ohio St. 2d at 73, 218 N.E.2d at 599.
13 Id. at 70-72, 218 N.E.2d at 597-98.
14 Id. at 69, 218 N.E.2d at 596-97.
15 See Lonzrick v. Republic Steel Corp., 6 Ohio St. 2d 227, 218 N.E.2d 185 (1966),
a personal property case decided just prior to Mitchem, wherein a strong dissent writ-
ten by Judge Taft and concurred in by Judge Schneider expressed the opinion that res
ipsa loquitur obviated the necessity of an implied warranty. Id. at 242, 218 N.E.2d at
195. Furthermore, it was pointed out that the Ohio General Assembly had taken legis-
lative action to protect the consumer, thus making certain acts negligence per se. Id.
at 247, 218 N.E.2d at 198. Finally, the dissent left to the legislature the task of ex-
tending coverage of section 2-318 of the Uniform Commercial Code. Id. at 251, 218
N.E.2d at 200-01.
Strict liability as applied to the implied warranty area may well have arisen as a re-
sult of those situations which could not be proven even with the aid of res ipsa loquitur.
Another consideration seems to have been the great public interest in human life, prop-
erty, health, and safety which demanded greater protection. The supplier or builder,
by placing his goods on the market, represented to the public that they were suitable
and fit for use. Finally, the vendor or manufacturer was better able to spread the losses
through higher prices and liability insurance. See Ashe, So You're Going To Try a
Products Liability Case, 13 HASTINGS L.J. 66, 70-74 (1961); Prosser, supra note 1, at
1114-24.
16 PROSSER, TORTS §g 39, 97 (3d ed. 1964).
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shown to have resulted from an instrumentality within the exclusive
possession of the defendant.' In a sense, this is assumed in implied
warranty cases, since the plaintiff need only prove that the injury
or damage was caused by a defect which existed in the product
when it left the control of the manufacturer or vendor.'" However,
the defendant, under either theory, has the same defenses available
to him. Under res ipsa loquitur, he may show that the plaintiff was
contributorily negligent or assumed the'risk or that the defendant's
act was not the proximate cause of the injury. 9 If strict liability is
used, the defendant may show that his act was not the proximate
cause or that the plaintiff was contributorily negligent or misused
the product."0 In both cases, the burden of proof is shifted to the
defendant only where the evidence is more readily accessible to him.
The overall burden of proof remains with the plaintiff, who must
still prove the requisite proximate cause.2'
Had the court in Mitchem allowed the plaintiff to try his case
under the theory of implied warranty, the defendant-builder would
have been able to escape liability by proving that modifications
made by the plaintiffs were the proximate cause of the damage.
Indeed, in those cases in which a builder has been held liable on
the basis of an implied warranty of fitness, occupancy, or habita-
bility,22 the courts have refrained from making the builder an in-
surer by implying a warranty that the building be reasonably fit for
17 9 WIGMORH, EvEDENcE § 2509, at 380-82 (3d ed. 1940). The following three
requirements for res ipsa loquitur are set out: (1) the act must be one which would
not have occurred without the negligence of someone, (2) it must be caused by an in-
strumentality exclusively in the control of defendant, and (3) the damage must not
result from any voluntary act or contribution of the defendant. Ibid.
18 Krupar v. Procter & Gamble Co., 160 Ohio St. 489, 494, 117 N.E.2d 7, 10
(1954).
19 This necessarily is the converse of the third requirement of res ipsa loquitur. See
note 17 supra.
20 PROSSER, op. cit. supra note 16, § 78, at 539. Some courts, however, do not rec-
ognize contributory negligence as a defense, although they allow a showing of misuse
in order to refute the defective condition. Greeno v. Clark Equip. Co., 237 F. Supp.
427 (N.D. Ind. 1965).
2 1 PROSSER, op. cit. supra note 16, §§ 40, 97.
2 2 F & S Constr. Co. v. Berube, 322 F.2d 782 (10th Cit. 1963); Glisan v. Smolen-
ske, 153 Colo. 274, 387 P.2d 260 (1963); Bethlahbmy v. Bechtel, 415 P.2d 698 (Idaho
1966); Weck v. A:M Sunrise Constr. Co., 36 Ill. App. 2d 383, 184 N.E.2d 728 (1962);
Jones v. Gatewood, 381 P.2d 158 (Okla. 1963); Hoye v. Century Builders, Inc., 52
Wash. 2d 830, 329 P.2d 474 (1958); Golin v. Sgrignoli, 83 Dauph. Co. Rep. 331
(1965); Miller v. Cannon Hill Estates, Ltd., [1931) 2 K.B. 113; Perry v. Sharon Dev.
Co. [1937] 4 All E.R. 390 (Ct. App.). Contra, Berger v. Burkoff, 200 Md. 561, 92
A.2d 376 (1952); Shapiro v. Kornicks, 103 Ohio App. 49, 124 N.E.2d 175 (1955);
Steiber v. Palumbo, 219 Ore. 479, 347 P.2d 978 (1959).
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its intended use. Despite the wording of the issue by Judge Schnei-
der in the Mitchem case,' the lower court had instructed the jury in
terms of a warranty "reasonably fit for its intended use and .. .
done in a reasonably efficient and workmanlike manner." 4 The
Vanderschrier case25 had found the builder to impliedly warrant
the "completion of the entire house in such a way that it would be
reasonably fit for its intended use ... and that the work would be
done in a reasonably efficient and workmanlike manner."26  Cer-
tainly this "reasonable" warranty would allow for those defects
which the Mitchem court says could not be avoided by the use of
reasonable skill and prudence.27 For example, in the Mitchem
case, if the builder could have graded the lot, built a retaining wall,
or furnished the drainage tile, it would seem reasonable that he
breached an implied warranty of fitness for use by his failure to do
so. The reasonable implied warranty thus has the effect of holding
the modern-day builder to a degree of skill commensurate with the
technological advances of the building trade. The finished product
need only be reasonably fit for use rather than be absolutely per-
fect.2
8
The caveat emptor doctrine, to which the Mitchem court adhered,
has been totally disgarded in the law of products liability. It is, in
essence, a medieval English doctrine which places on the buyer the
duty of discovering any defects in the goods.29 The reasoning be-
hind the doctrine was that the buyer and seller were on equal terms
and that the purchaser had an opportunity to inspect the vendor's
wares."0 Therefore, a builder, lessor, or seller was liable only if he
knew of the existence of a latent defect which he failed to disclose
to the purchaser."' The burden of proof was placed on the plaintiff
to establish privity of contract as well as the tort requirements of
duty, breach, proximate cause, and damage. If the buyer was unable
23 Judge Schneider phrased the question involved as follows: "whether an implied
warranty, in favor of the vendee of an uncompleted structure that it will, when finished,
be suitable (and not merely reasonably so) for the purpose intended, should be imposed
upon the vendor .... 7 Ohio St. 2d at 68-69, 218 N.E.2d at 596.
24 Id. at 68, 218 N.E.2d at 596. (Emphasis added.)
25 Vanderschrier v. Aaron, 103 Ohio App. 340, 140 N.E.2d 819 (1957). For a
discussion of the case, see text accompanying note 10 supra.
26 Id. at 342, 140 N.E.2d at 821. (Emphasis added.)
27 7 Ohio St. 2d at 73, 218 N.E.2d at 599.
28 Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., 44 N.J. 70, 92, 207 A.2d 314, 326 (1965).
2 9 Seavey, Caveat Emptor as of 1960, 38 TExAs L. REv. 439, 441 (1960).
30 Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., 44 N.J. 70, 91, 207 A.2d 314, 326 (1965).
3 1 Borggard v. Gale, 205 Ill. 511, 68 N.E. 1063 (1903).
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to prove his case by this method or by fraud or misrepresentation as
an alternative, the buyer was often left with a defective product
and no adequate remedy.
Over the last twenty years, however, many courts seem to have
entirely disgarded the doctrine of caveat emptor in cases similar to
Mitchem." Indeed the overall number of cases that have applied
the doctrine has diminished, 3 undoubtedly because, with modern
technological and scientific progressions in almost all industries, in-
cluding the building trade, there is no longer an equality of bargain-
ing power between the vendor and the purchaser. The balance has
shifted in favor of the skilled craftsman who is more familiar with
the highly mechanized component parts of a house than is the av-
erage buyer, who, more than likely, will purchase one new home in
his entire lifetime.3 4
Another practicality that pursuaded the courts to disregard caveat
emptor was the tremendous building boom following the Korean
and Second World Wars." The great demand for new housing
and the shortage of supplies resulted in a scarcity of housing during
the war years. With this shortage, the post-war builder was often
able to erect hastily constructed prefabricated homes to meet the
rising demand without fear of the buyer exercising his right of in-
spection and knowing that if defects were discovered after purchase,
the doctrine of caveat emptor would be a bar to liability." Tvo
factors may create a similar situation in the near future. Tight
mortgage money over the last year has limited the number of pro-
spective purchasers and therefore the demand for housing. In addi-
tion, the war in Vietnam and inflation seemingly have begun to
limit investment capital in general and investment in building more
specifically. Should both elements terminate at once, the demand
for housing could well exceed the supply, resulting in a favorable
climate for the builder. With simple economics in his favor, the
builder can well afford to resist the purchaser's request for an ex-
press warranty. In overlooking these practicalities, the Mitchem
court has taken the position that, if insistent, the purchaser can se-
3 2 Cases cited note 22 supra.
33 7 WILISTON, CONTRACTS § 926A (3d ed. 1963).
3 4 Kessler & Fine, Culpa In Contrahendo, Bargaining in Good Faith and Freedom of
Contract: A Comparative Study, 77 HARV. L. REV. 401, 404 (1964). See Bethlahmj,
v. Bechtel, 415 P.2d 698, 710 (Idaho 1966).
35 Bearman, Caveat Emptor in Sales of Realty - Recent Assaults Upon the Rule,
14 VAND. L REV. 541, 542 (1961).
36 Ibid.
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cure an express warranty.3" This assumption raises the question of
what constitutes insistence. Seemingly, an insistence requirement
would complicate the commercial transaction by placing an added
obligation on the purchaser to badger and argue with the builder in
order to come to contract terms. In perspective, it would not be
dissimilar to a lessee insisting on the exclusion of a disclaimer clause
in a lease during a housing shortage. An insistence requirement
would also clutter the courts with technicalities and require the
jury to make an added determination.
The Mitchem case was also based upon the proposition that only
if the finished product is personal property, will an agreement to
furnish labor and materials be a sale and thereby carry with it an
implied warranty of fitness 8 The general rule has been that where
a house and lot are purchased together, the contract of sale for the
house becomes merged with the deed and thus bars an implied war-
ranty. 9 A new trend, however, seems to make a distinction be-
tween the sale of land and an agreement to construct a building on
the land.4" Under this theory, in a case involving the sale of a lot
and a contract to build a home, the latter, the court said, was a
contract for work, labor, and materials, and was found to carry with
it an implied warranty of fitness for human habitation.4
Adoption of this theory results in two extensions of the "reason-
able" implied warranty of habitability. In the first place the buyer
would have an action against the manufacturer of the materials as
well as the builder. On the basis of this reasoning, the court, in
Spence v. Three River Builders & Masonry Supply, Inc.,42 permitted
the plaintiff to recover on an implied warranty when his home col-
lapsed due to the manufacturer's faulty cinder blocks. Secondly, it
has been suggested that a provision similar to the implied warranty
of fitness for a particular purpose in the Uniform Commercial Code
37 7 Ohio St. 2d at 69, 218 N.E.2d at 596-97.
3 8 Id. at 69, 218 N.E.2d at 598.
39 Dunham, Vendor's Obligation as to Fitness of Land for a Particular Purpose, 37
MINN. L. R.Ev. 108, 111-12 (1953); Note, Implied Warranties in the Sale of New
Houses, 26 U. PiTT. L. REv. 862, 863 (1965).
40 F & S Constr. Co. v. Berube, 322 F.2d 782, 784 (10th Cit. 1963); Golin v. Sgrig-
noli, 83 Dauph. Co. Rep. 331 (1965); 7 WILLISTON, op. cit. supra note 33, § 926A,
at 813.
41 Hoye v. Century Builders, Inc., 52 Wash. 2d 830, 833, 329 P.2d 474, 476
(1958).
42353 Mich. 120, 90 N.W.2d 873 (1958).
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(UCC) be enacted to protect the purchaser." However, if a sale of
an uncompleted building is a contract for work, labor, and materials,
it may fall within the UCC itself. At the time of sale, the building
materials are both identifiable and moveable goods as defined under
section 2-105 of the Code. The builder is a seller of goods, and
the purchaser is a buyer under section 2-103.'" The buyer might
find a remedy in section 2-315 which provides for an implied war-
ranty of fitness for a particular purpose.45 Furthermore, if a model
were involved or if a description or architectural blueprint were of-
fered by the builder, the vendee might recover on an express war-
ranty of sample or description under section 2-313." Perhaps he
could also recover on an implied warranty of merchantability.47
The courts over the last two decades have made two major dis-
tinctions or classifications in applying the principle of implied war-
ranties of habitability. The first class contains cases like Mitchem,
in which the builder-vendor sells the lot and house while it is in
the process of being completed. In the second class are the cases in
which the builder-vendor sells both the lot and residence after the
latter is completed. This classification process raises difficult ques-
tions of fact such as when is a house actually completed.4" The
practical rationale used by the courts for making the distinction be-
tween the two classes is generally that a house which is in the
process of construction is more difficult to inspect than is one which
is in its completed form.49 The courts have therefore been more
willing to apply the doctrine to the first class. Accordingly, it has
been held in a number of jurisdictions that when a house is being
constructed, the builder-vendor, at the time of sale, impliedly war-
rants that the house will be completed in a workmanlike manner
4 3 Haskell, The Case for an Implied Warranty of Quality in Sales of Property, 53
Gno. LJ. 633, 651-52 (1965).
44 Section 2-103(1) (a) states that the term "Buyer means a person who buys or
contracts to buy goods." A seller, under § 2-103(1) (d) "means a person who sells or
contracts to sell goods." UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-103.
45 This section requires that the seller have reason to know of any particular purpose
for which the goods are intended and that the buyer is relying on the seller's skill or
judgement. This is almost always the case in building and construction contracts. See
text accompanying note 34 supra.
46Under subsections (b) and (c) of this section, any description or model of the
goods which is a part of the basis of the bargain becomes an express warranty. Com-
ment 5 of § 2-313 suggests that this section is applicable to blueprints. See UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 2-313 (b), (c) & comment 5.
4 7 UZTFoRM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-314.
4851 ILL. BJ. 498, 501 (1963).
49 Miller v. Cannon Hill Estates, Ltd., [1931) 2 K.B. 113.
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and will be reasonably fit for occupancy, habitability, or the use for
which it was intended.5" In light of this, it would seem that the
Mitchem court has taken a step backward by refusing to recognize
the trend toward the implied warranty.51
The second class of cases, those in which homes are sold after
they have been completed,52 are often analogized to the area of
products liability law. For example, one authority has said that
today's homes are composed of as many parts as a chattel, and as
a result, the builder should be held to a stricter requirement of
inspection." Indeed, it is submitted that whether or not the defect
has occurred before or after the house was sold should make no
difference.54
The case which has most greatly extended the implied warranty
is Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc.,55 decided by the New Jersey Su-
preme Court in 1965. Schipper arose when the infant son of the
purchaser's lessee was injured by a defect in the hot water system
installed by the builder. The court noted that Levitt, the builder,
5 0 Cases cited note 22 supra.
5 1 This trend began with the adoption of English case law by the American courts.
One of the earliest cases to adopt the English implied warranty was Vanderschrier v.
Aaron, 103 Ohio App. 340, 140 N.E.2d 819 (1957), which was based upon Perry v.
Sharon Dev. Co., [1937] 4 All E.R. 390 (Ct. App.). The year following Vanderschrier,
the case of Hoye v. Century Builders, Inc., 52 Wash. 2d 830, 329 P.2d 474 (1958),
was decided on an implied warranty of fitness for habitation. This was followed by a
Colorado case, F & S Constr. Co. v. Berube, 322 F.2d 782 (10th Cir. 1963), in which
the court held that the home builder had breached an implied warranty of fitness in
constructing the house. The opinion in Mitchem cites three cases, Carpenter v. Donohoe,
154 Colo. 78, 388 P.2d 399 (1964), Glisan v. Smolenske, 153 Colo. 274, 387 P.2d
260 (1963), and Jones v. Gatewood, 381 P.2d 158 (Okla. 1963), which the Ohio Su-
preme Court distinguishes away merely by declaring that they involved undisclosed de-
fects caused by the builder's negligence. 7 Ohio St. 2d at 71, 218 N.E.2d at 598. On the
contrary, if the factual situations of these cases are scrutinized, it becomes clear that the
plaintiffs would have found it difficult and perhaps impossible to win a judgment on the
basis of pure negligence. Furthermore, the Mitchem court, by making this point, inten-
tionally de-emphasizes the fact that all three were decided on the basis of an implied
warranty. The most recent case to follow this relatively new rule of law is Bethlahmy
v. Bechtel, 415 P.2d 698 (Idaho 1966), decided just fifteen days before Mitchem. Al-
though the case was based upon both constructive fraud and an implied warranty, the
court strongly advocated an implied warranty of fitness. Id. at 711.5 2 Carpenter v. Donohoe, supra note 51; Loraso v. Custom Built Homes, Inc., 144
So. 2d 459 (La. App. 1962); Loma Vista Dev. Co. v. Johnson, 177 S.W.2d 225 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1943), revrd on other grounds, 142 Tex. 686, 180 S.W.2d 922 (1944).
53 Bearman, supra note 35, at 569.
54 The distinction some courts continue to make is antiquated. The defect, for ex-
ample, even in the case of the partially completed house, may not come to light until
the purchaser has moved in or until the house has been exposed to the various weath-
ering elements of the four seasons.
5544 N.J. 70, 207 A.2d 314 (1965).
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had assembled parts, including the water heater, in constructing the
house in much the same manner as do manufacturers of automo-
biles and planes who have been liable to remote users. 5  A pur-
chaser of a house, the court said, is no better able to protect himself
in a deed than is the purchaser of a car when he receives his standard
form bill of sale.5" The New Jersey Supreme Court cited with
approval the New York case of Inman v. Binghamton Housing
Authority," and joined with that court in agreeing with Dean Pros-
ser's assertion that "there is no visible reason for any distinction
between the liability of one who supplies a chattel and one who
erects a structure."59  As to a warranty making the builder an in-
surer, the Schipper court, juxtaposed to the position taken by the
Mlitchem court, explained that under the theory of warranty, the
plaintiff must still prove proximate cause and damages. It must
also be noted that the court applied the warranty to the entire house
rather than to just the heater and emphasized:
The law should be based on current concepts of what is right
and just and the judiciary should be alert to the never-ending need
for keeping its common law principles abreast of the times., An-
cient distinctions which make no sense in today's society and tend
to discredit the law should be readily rejected .... 6o
In its reluctance to make the builder an insurer, the Mitchem court
overlooked this sound precept.
The result in the Schipper case, as in others, 1 indicates a new
tendency by the courts to widen the application of the implied war-
ranty to realty. As evidenced by Schipper, the warranty runs not
only to the purchasers of partially completed homes and newly com-
pleted homes but to their lessees as well. If the courts carry the
reasonable implied warranty of suitability one step further, the pur-
chasers of used homes might also be protected, subject to a short
statute of limitations which would take depreciation into account."2
An innovation in the relatively new area of poverty law might be
achieved if the courts are willing to imply a warranty by the lessor
that his tenement apartment is fit for habitation when the lessee
56 Id. at 82, 207 A.2d at 321.
57 d. at 92, 207 A.2d at 326.
58 3 N.Y.2d 137, 143 N.E.2d 895, 164 N.Y.S.2d 699 (1957).
5944 N.J. at 84, 207 A.2d at 322, citing, PRossER, ToRTs § 85, at 519 (2d ed.
1955).
60 44 N.J. at 90, 207 A.2d at 325.
61 Cases cited note 52 supra.
6 2 Haskell, supra note 43, at 652.
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rents it. This too could be subject to a statute of limitations com-
mensurate with the type of lease. Instead of a statute of limitations,
the courts might use the measure of a reasonable time under the cir-
cumstances and permit the landlord to introduce evidence proving
that the apartment's substandard condition was due to the lessee's
improper care. However, as evidenced by the Mitchem case, consid-
erable time may elapse before such a utilization of the implied war-
raity is effectuated in Ohio.
IRA H. MEYER
